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International Law and the Protection
of Biological Diversity
Daniel M. Bodansky
ABSTRACT

This article provides a general overview of international
environmental law and biodiversity. First, the article argues
that biodiversity is an international issue because
international cooperation is necessary to implement national
preservation policies effectively and because the benefits of
biodiversity accrue in part to the international community.
Second, the article discusses existing international law
relevant to biodiversity, including wildlife and habitat
protection treaties, the 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity,
and general principles of international
environmental law such as the precautionaryprinciple, the
principle of intergenerational equity, and the principle of
differentiated responsibilities.
Finally, the article
recommends that the internationalcommunity use incentives
rather than trade bans to encourage Third World nations to
protect their biological resources.
Professor Bodansky
suggests expanding the recognition of intellectual property
rights in biological resources and the use of transfer
payments to compensate poorer countries for protecting

biodiversity.
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Wildlife protection is one of the oldest subjects of
international environmental law. 1
Only relatively recently,
however, has the focus of international law broadened from the
protection of particular species or groups of species to the
2
conservation of biological diversity as such.
This article provides a general overview of international
environmental law and biodiversity as a framework for the other
articles in this Symposium, which address more specific issues
relating to the protection of biological diversity. It focuses on

three general questions: First, why is the protection of biological
diversity an international issue? Second, how does international
law presently protect biological diversity? Finally, what are some
of the future directions the protection of biodiversity might take?
I. THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF THE
BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY ISSUE

To begin with, why is the protection of biodiversity an
international problem?
In some cases, the answer to this
question is obvious. Some species cross national boundaries,
migrating from place to place (e.g., certain species of birds and
land animals such as polar bears). Other species are found in
areas of the global commons, such as the oceans (e.g., whales and
fish).
In both of these cases, an obvious need exists for
international management, as no single country can protect these
species on its own. If the United States were to stop whaling, for
example, as it has done, or to stop fishing salmon, and other
countries continued to exploit these species, biodiversity would
still be threatened. Because of the international distribution of
these species, they were the first types of biological resources to
be addressed internationally, in migratory bird and fishery
3
protection treaties.

1.

See

LYNTON

K.

CALDWELL,

INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL

POLICY:

EMERGENCE AND DIMENSIONS 30-40 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing early cooperative
efforts in environmental matters); SIMON LYSIER, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW at xxi

(1985) (discussing early laws to protect wildlife and the move towards
international treaties).
2.

PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

ENVIRONMENT 420, 484 (1992); ALEXANDRE KISS & DINAH SHELTON, INTERNATIONAL

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 240-41 (1991).
3.
See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16Dec. 8, 1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702; Convention for the Regulation of
Whaling, Sept. 24, 1931, 49 Stat. 3079, 155 L.N.T.S. 349; Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries, Feb. 8, 1949, 1 U.S.T. 477, 157 U.N.T.S. 157.
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Most species, however, do not migrate from country to
country and are not found within the global commons. Most are
found within particular countries.
It may seem odd that the protection of seemingly local species
of plants and animals is an international issue, particularly given
the traditional rule of international law that countries have
national sovereignty over their natural resources. 4 One would
expect, given this rule, that habitat and wildlife protection would
be an individual matter for each country to undertake and
enforce-that land use and wildlife law would be legislated at the

local level rather than the international level.
There are two reasons why the problem of protecting even
seemingly local species has an international dimension. 5 One
reason is that, in some cases, the threats to species have an
international character. For instance, international trade can
lead to poaching and other activities that deplete a species that
the source country wishes to protect. In these types of situations,
international cooperation is needed to effectively implement
national conservation measures. The rationale for international
cooperation is similar to the rationale for international
cooperation in law enforcement. Although punishment of crimes
is ordinarily a national matter, international cooperation is often
required in order to gather evidence, obtain custody of the
offender, and thereby make national laws more effective. This
interest in international cooperation was the rationale for
Appendix III of the 1973 Convention on International Trade in
6
Endangered Species (CITES).
The other reason for international concern about biological
resources found within a particular country is that the benefits of

4.
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A. Res. 1803, U.N.
GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 107, U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1962), reprinted in 2
I.L.M. 223 (1963); PermanentSovereignty over NaturalResources, G.A. Res. 3171,
U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973), reprinted
in 13 I.L.M. 238 (1974).
5.
Cf. BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 2, at 448-52 (discussing the
international community's interest in the protection of biodiversity).
6.
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, opened for signatureMar. 3, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S.

243 [hereinafter CITES]. Appendices I and II contain lists of endangered species
agreed upon collectively by the parties to the Convention. Id. art. II, XV. In
contrast, Appendix III consists of species identified by an individual party to the
Convention as being subject to regulation within its jurisdiction. Id. art. XVI.

These species are subject to export restrictions by the listing party; but, to be
effective, the export restrictions require the cooperation of importing countries.
Id. art. V.
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conservation are, in part, global in character.7 To the extent that
the benefits of conservation are global, they are a positive
externality. International action helps internalize that externality,
giving states where the resources are found an incentive to
8
conserve, by sharing in the benefits of conservation.
There are several global benefits of biodiversity that the
international community should seek to internalize. 9
First,
biological resources are a repository of valuable information in the
form of genetic codes.10
Preserving that information may
eventually make possible the development of new drugs or crops.

Second, biodiversity provides insurance against events that might
devastate a particular species (e.g., pests or disease). Just as
diversifying an investment portfolio reduces risk, maintaining
biological diversity, in essence, provides insurance against
catastrophes that might befall a particular species.1 1 Finally,
ecosystem diversity provides global benefits in terms of ecological
services, such as purifying water supplies and preventing land
degradation. 12
It is this broader perspective on the global benefits of
conserving biological diversity that, in part, underlies the 1992
U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity. 13 One of the principal
functions of the Biodiversity Convention is to allow countries
where biological resources are found to realize or recapture some

7.
The following discussion of the global values of biodiversity draws
heavily on Timothy M. Swanson, Economics of a Biodiversity Convention, 21 AMBIO
250 (1992). In his article, Swanson stresses the need for an international
agreement that brings the global benefits of biodiversity into the local
decisionmaking process. Id. at 256-57.
8.
Michael Wells, Biodiversity Conservation, Affluence and Poverty:
Mismatched Costs and Benefits and Efforts to Remedy Them, 21 AMBIO 237 (1992).
9.
See generally Clifford S. Russell, Two Propositions About Biodiversity,
28 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 689 (1995). See also JEFFREY A. MCNEELY ET AL.,
CONSERVING THE WORLD'S BIOLOGICAL DIVERSIiY 25-35 (1990).

10.
According to the distinguished biologist, Edward 0. Wilson, "[e]very
microorganism, animal and plant contains on the order of from one million to 10
billion bits of information in its genetic code, hammered into existence by an
astronomical number of mutations and episodes of natural selection over the
course of thousands or millions of years of evolution." Edward 0. Wilson, Threats
to Biodiversity, 261 SCI. AM. 108, 114 (1989).
11.
Swanson, supranote 7, at 253-54.
12.
MCNEELY ETAL., supranote 9, at 32.
13.
Opened for signature, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818 (entered into force
Dec. 29, 1993) [hereinafter Biodiversity Convention]. See Lee A. Kimball, The
Biodiversity Convention: How to Make It Work, 28 VAND. J. TRANsNAT'L L. 763
(1995) (discussing the Convention in greater detail); Jeffrey A. McNeely et al., The
Convention on BiologicalDiversity: Promise and Frustration,4 J. ENVTL. & DEV. 33
(1995).
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of the value of those resources, and thereby provide them an
incentive to engage in conservation.

II.

PRESENT INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE

PROTECTION OF BIOLOGICAL DIvERSITy

Over the last twenty to twenty-five years, international
environmental law has developed a number of general principles
Whether these
that are relevant to biodiversity protection. 14
general principles constitute customary international law is a
morass into which this article will not delve. s Regardless of
whether these principles have the status of customary
international law, however, they represent an orientation or
framework for international discussions of environmental issues.
The three principles most relevant to biological diversity are:
of
precautionary
principle,
(2) the principle
(1) the
intergenerational equity, and (3) the principle of differentiated
responsibilities.
The precautionary principle says that the
international community need not await scientific certainty before
taking action to protect the environment, particularly when the
potential environmental harms are irreversible.' 6 This principle
is clearly relevant to the biodiversity question, given the
substantial uncertainties about the magnitude of the problem.
Some skeptics argue that there is insufficient evidence to
17
conclude that the world is on the brink of mass extinctions.

However,

the

precautionary

principle,

which

is

explicitly

recognized in the preamble to the Biological Diversity
Convention,' 8 responds that certainty is not necessary before

undertaking action.

The second relevant principle is intergenerational equity, 19
which says that people have a duty to conserve resources for the
benefit not only of the present generation but of future

See Philippe Sands, The 'Greening" of International Law: Emerging
14.
Principlesand Rules, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 293, 297-311 (1994) (analyzing
basic principles of international environmental law).
15.
See Daniel M. Bodansky, Customary (and Not So Customary)
InternationalEnvironmentalLaw, IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming).
16.
Daniel M. Bodansky, Scientific Uncertainty and the Precautionary
Principle,ENVIRONMENT, Sept. 1991, at 4, 4-5.
17.
Andrew R. Solow & James M. Broadus, Issues in the Measurement of
BiologicalDiversity, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT' L 695 (1995).
18.
Biodiversity Convention, supranote 13, pmbl., para. 9.
19.
See generally EDITH BROWN WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS
(1989) (discussing the theory of intergenerational equity and its application to
environmental issues).
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generations as well. Intergenerational equity is relevant to the
biological diversity problem because some of the values of
biological diversity mentioned previously, namely as a source of
information and as an insurance policy, largely benefit future
generations.
Finally, the principle of differentiated responsibilities
addresses the concerns of developing countries, where most
biodiversity is found.
According to this principle, countries
should contribute differently to international environmental
efforts, depending on their capabilities and their historical
responsibility. In practice, this principle has meant preferential
treatment of poor, developing countries, and a greater
contribution by wealthy, developed countries.
These three principles provide the general framework for
efforts to conserve biological resources. However, they are not a
panacea2 0 They do not answer the hard questions about exactly
how much evidence is needed before undertaking conservation
measures or how much protection is warranted, nor do they
21
dictate any particular regulatory policies.
The more specific rules and mechanisms to conserve
biological diversity are found primarily in treaties.2 2 Over the last
fifty to sixty years, a whole range of treaties has been negotiated.
One general category includes wildlife protection treaties
addressing particular species 23 or groups of species, such as
migratory birds 2 4 or whales. 25 The primary purpose of these

treaties is to protect against over-exploitation of species by
humans. They attempt to achieve this objective by establishing
procedures for listing species that may be threatened or
endangered and that require some kind of international
protection, and by providing for the development of a regulatory

20.
Russell, supranote 9, at 691-92.
21.
Bodansky, supranote 16, at 5.
22.
See generally LYSTER, supranote 1.
23.
E.g., Agreement on the Conservation of Polar Bears, Nov. 15, 1973, 27
U.S.T. 3918, 13 I.L.M. 13; Convention for the Conservation and Management of
the Vicuna, Dec. 20, 1979, reprintedin UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME,
2 SELECTED MULTILATERAL TREATIES IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT 74 (Iwona

Rummel-Bulska & Seth Osafo eds., 1991) [hereinafter MULTILATERAL TREATIES].
24.
E.g., Convention for the Protection of Migratory Birds, Aug. 16-Dec. 8,
1916, U.S.-Gr. Brit., 39 Stat. 1702; Convention for the Protection of Migratory
Birds and Game Mammals, Feb. 7, 1936, U.S.-Mex., 50 Stat. 1311.
25.
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946,
62 Stat. 1716, 161 U.N.T.S. 72. The most general wildlife protection treaty is
CITES. CITES, supranote 6.
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system to protect those listed species against human uses (e.g., a
permitting system).26
The bigger threat to species, however, is not over-harvesting
by humans but rather habitat loss. 2 7
To protect biological
diversity, emphasis needs to be placed not simply on protecting
particular species, but on protecting the broader ecosystems in
which they live. A number of international treaties have been
developed to address the need for habitat conservation. The first
global convention to do so was the 1971 Ramsar Convention on
the protection of wetlands of international significance. 28 Ramsar
was followed in 1972 by the World Heritage Convention, 2 9 which
provides for the protection of cultural and natural sites of
universal value, including habitats such as the Great Barrier
Reef, the Everglades, and the Olympic Rainforest. These habitat
protection treaties generally establish a system of protected areas
under which countries can designate areas for inclusion on an
international list.3 0 After the areas are listed, the conventions
attempt to encourage protection measures.
A final category of wildlife treaties are regional treaties that
address nature conservation in a comprehensive fashion through
both species protection and habitat protection. The first of these
regional conventions was developed for Africa. 3 ' Subsequently,
regional treaties have been developed for the Western
34
Hemisphere,3 2 Europe,3 3 and Southeast Asia.

26.
See BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 2, at 454-59 (describing this approach
and analyzing its use in various treaties).
27.
WORLD RESOURCES INSTrIE ET AL., WORLD RESOURCES 1994-1995, at

149 (1994).
28.
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance Especially as
Waterfowl Habitat, Feb. 2, 1971, 996 U.N.T.S. 245, 11 I.L.M. 969 [hereinafter
Ramsar Convention].
29.
Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural
Heritage, Nov. 23, 1972, 27 U.S.T. 37, 1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World
Heritage Convention].
30.
WORLD RESOURCES INSTITUTE Er AL., supra note 27, at 152. See, e.g.,
Ramsar Convention, supra note 28, art. 2; World Heritage Convention, supra note
29, art. 11.
31.
Convention Relative to the Preservation of Fauna and Flora in Their
Natural State, Nov. 8, 1933, 172 L.N.T.S. 241. This convention has been
superseded by the African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, Sept. 15, 1968, 1001 U.N.T.S. 3.

32.

Convention on Nature Protection and Wildlife Preservation in the

Western Hemisphere, opened for signature Oct. 12, 1940, 56 Stat. 1354, 161
U.N.T.S. 193.
33.
Convention on the Conservation of European Wildlife and Natural
Habitats, Sept. 19, 1979, Eur. T.S. No. 104.
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When the idea of developing a global biodiversity convention
first began to gather momentum in the late 1980s, some
suggested that it should serve as an umbrella agreement,
consolidating and subsuming the many wildlife treaties developed
since the turn of the century. 35 Ultimately, this plan did not
prove practicable. Instead, the 1992 Convention on Biological
Diversity has served as a framework agreement that builds upon,
rather than subsumes, existing treaties. 3 6 In contrast to earlier
treaties, it does not include any lists or annexes of protected
species or areas. The Biodiversity Convention, however, goes
beyond previous treaties by dealing with the problem of
biodiversity in a more comprehensive fashion, addressing all
aspects of biodiversity including access to biological resources,
37
biotechnology, and financial resources.
"Contractual obligations" are the final general source of
international law relating to biodiversity.
Generally, these
agreements are not between different countries (i.e. treaties), but
between countries and private enterprises. The two general types
of contractual undertakings are "debt for nature swaps," under

which a country agrees to engage in conservation measures in
return for the forgiveness of some of its foreign debt,3 8 and
"access agreements," under which a country makes available its

biological resources to others in exchange for transfers of money
(e.g., royalty payments) or technology. The first of these access

34.
ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, July 9, 1985, reprinted in MULTILATERAL TREATIES, supra note 23, at
343.
35.
UNEP Governing CouncilDecision 14/26: Rationalizationof International
Conventions on Biological Diversity, U.N. Environment Programme, 14th Sess.,
Annex I, at 58, U.N. Doc. UNEP/GC.14/26 (1987); Francoise Burhenne-Guilmin
& Susan Casey-Lefkowitz, The Convention on Biological Diversity: A Hard Won
GlobalAchievement, 3 Y.B. INT"L ENVTL. L. 43, 44-45 (1992).
36.
One of the issues that arose both during the negotiation of the treaty
and subsequently has been the relationship between the Biodiversity Convention
and the other more specific treaties on biodiversity discussed above. This is
addressed in article 22 of the Convention. Biodiversity Convention, supra note
13, art. 22.
37.
Burhenne-Guilmin & Casey-Lelkowitz, supra note 35, at 45-46. See
also Melinda Chandler, The Biodiversity Convention: Selected Issues of Interest to
the InternationalLawyer, 4 COLO. J. INTL ENVrL. L. & POL'Y 141 (1993); Clare Shine
& Palitha T.B. Kohona, The Convention on Biological Diversity: Bridging the Gap
Between Conservation and Development, 1 REV. EUR. COMMUNITY & INT'L ENVTL. L.
278 (1992).
38.
Marianne Lachman, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: A Case Study in
TransactionalNegotiation, 2 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 139 (1989); Catherine A.
O'Neill & Cass R. Sunstein, Economics and the Environment: Trading Debt and
Technology for Nature, 17 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 93 (1992).
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agreements was an agreement between Merck Pharmaceutical
39
and Costa Rica.
The various sources of international law relating to
biodiversity have a number of common themes. One theme is
The state in which the
respect for national sovereignty. 4°
biological resources or habitat are found has sovereignty over
those resources. To some extent, national sovereignty has had
negative implications. For example, before a habitat can be listed
under an international convention, the country where the habitat
is found must propose the area for listing. 4 1 Similarly, states
have a right to opt out of regulations with which they disagree,
and cannot be bound against their will. International action thus
depends on the consent of the source state. On the other hand,
national sovereignty can also be a tool for conservation, by
allowing the source state to charge access fees and thereby
recapture some of the value of its resources, which would

otherwise be an externality.

The Merck-Costa Rica agreement

provides an example of how this process might work. 42
A second theme of these agreements is that they are
facilitative in nature. They generally do not try to coerce, but
simply encourage states to conserve biological diversity. This
emphasis on facilitation rather than coercion is a corollary of the
principle of national sovereignty.
The final theme of the agreements is their flexibility. They
allow their lists of species or protected areas to be amended, not
through a formal amendment process, involving ratification by
each party, but generally by a simple super-majority vote. This
allows for the lists to change in response to new information and
4
new problems. 3

39.
See Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting:
Fulfillingthe Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNT'L L. 703,
724-29 (1995). See also Elissa Blum, Making Biodiversity ConservationProfitable:
A Case Study of the Merck1fNBio Agreement, ENVIRONMENT, May 1993, at 16.
See, e.g., Biodiversity Convention, supra note 13, pmbl., para. 4 & art.
40.
15(1); Ramsar Convention, supra note 28, art. 2(3). Cf. Susan H. Bragdon,
National Sovereignty and Global Environmental Responsibility: Can The Tension Be
Reconciled for the Conservation of Biological Diversity?, 33 HARV. INT'L L.J. 381
(1992) (arguing that conservation of biological diversity will require changes in the

traditional principle of national sovereignty).
41.
See, e.g., Ramsar Convention, supra note 28, art. 2(1), (5); World
Heritage Convention, supranote 29, art. 11(3).
42.
Michael D. Coughlin, Jr., Recent Development, Using the Merck-fNBio
Agreement to Clarfy the Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'LL. 337, 339 (1993).
43.
See, e.g., CITES, supranote 6, art. XV.
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III. FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN BIODIVERSITY PROTECTION
In trying to further develop international law relating to
biodiversity, the international community should not try to
impose duties on states and coerce them into undertaking
conservation measures. First of all, this is unlikely to work. The
international community has few means at its disposal to force
states to do things they do not otherwise want to do. Moreover, a
coercive approach would not be fair, given the fact that most
biodiversity is found in relatively poor countries in the southern
hemisphere. 4 4 It is unreasonable to expect these countries to
spend a lot of money to protect biological resources, the main
benefits of which accrue not to them directly but to the
international community. 45
Rather than require states to
conserve biological resources, the preferable approach is to give
states an incentive to engage in conservation
measures, making
46
conservation preferable to the alternatives.
The incentives-based approach has a number of implications
for the legal mechanisms that should be developed to protect
biological resources. 47
One implication is that the global
community should try to roll back or eliminate international
policies that prevent source countries from realizing the full
market value of their biological resources.
For example,
prohibitions on trade in species, or products from species, that
have an economic value and that can be utilized in a sustainable
way make it impossible for the source country to reap the full
value of its biological resources. As a result, the source state has
less incentive to conserve. This is the reason many economists
argue that, in the long run, the blanket ban on trade in elephant
ivory will actually be detrimental to elephant conservation
efforts.48 Arguably, the blanket ban eliminates one of the main
44.
Coughlin, Jr., supranote 42, at 339.
45.
Regardless of the merits of unfunded mandates imposed by the United
States federal government on the individual states of the Union, unfunded
mandates imposed by the industrial North on poorer countries in the South in
order to protect biological resources are fundamentally unfair.
46.
See Jon H. Goldstein, The Prospects for Using Market Incentives to
Conserve Biological Diversity, 21 ENVTL. L. 985 (1991) (discussing attempts to
establish markets in wildlife, and obstacles to doing so).
47.
See generally Swanson, supra note 7 (discussing the need for these
mechanisms to compensate countries that generate global benefits through the
conservation of their biological resources).
48.
E.g., EDWARD B. BARBIER ET AL., ELEPHANTS, ECONOMICS AND IVORY 13238 (1990); Randy Simmons & Urs Kreirler, Save an Elephant-Buy Ivory, Wash.
Post, Oct. 1, 1989, at D3. See also DAVID HARLAND, KILLING GAME: IMERNATIONAL
LAW AND THE AFRICAN ELEPHANr 167-75 (1994) (suggesting alternatives allowing for
"shadow trade" or trade based on exclusive marketing agreements).
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economic incentives (i.e., sale of elephant ivory) for source
countries to engage in conservation measures to protect against
the loss of elephant habitat.
A second implication is that the international community

may need to expand the property rights of countries or individuals
to their biological resources.
Specifically, the international
community may need to create intellectual property rights to the
informational value of biodiversity. Current intellectual property
law does not recognize any rights to the information contained in
natural genetic resources. 4 9 If the international community were
to create an intellectual property right in these resources, the
source countries would have a greater incentive to protect that
50
information.
A final implication is that in some cases Northern
industrialized countries will need to make financial payments to
source counties in the South. Even if source countries were able
to realize the full market values of their biological resources
through free trade, access agreements, and recognition of
intellectual property rights to genetic resources, these market
values are unlikely to provide source countries with a sufficient
incentive to take strong conservation measures.5 1 Some of the
benefits of biological diversity are essentially public goods.
Countries or individuals cannot be excluded from these
benefits.5 2
Unless the international community forces the
beneficiaries of public goods to contribute to conservation
measures that help produce those goods, the classic problems of
public goods will result-namely, under-production and overconsumption. The Biological Diversity Convention constitutes a
preliminary attempt to make countries that benefit from
biodiversity resources contribute to efforts tO preserve those
resources by requiring developed countries to provide new and
additional financial resources to enable developing countries to
53
meet their incremental costs of implementing the Convention.
In conclusion, there is currently a good deal of international
law that relates in some fashion to biological diversity. The task
is not just to develop the law further, but to consolidate the
current law, eliminate inconsistencies, and make the treaties that

49.

Jeffrey P. Kushan, Biodiversity:

Opportunities and Obligations, 28

VAND. J. TRANSM'L. 755 (1995).
50.
Swanson, supranote 7, at 256.
51.
See Christopher D. Stone, What to Do About Biodiversity: Property
Rights, Public Goods, and the Earth'sBiological Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 577, 616
(1995).

52.
53.

Id. at 583.
Biodiversity Convention, supranote 13, art. 20.
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have been developed over the last fifty or sixty years function
more harmoniously and effectively.

